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Abstract 
 
We use game theory concepts and tools to model the technology choices of firms that face a 
trade-off between the short-term profits from “dirty” technologies and the long-term benefits of a 
clean environment. When the nominal costs from adopting environmentally friendly 
technologies are “high enough,” then choosing “dirty” technologies is a dominant strategy.  
However, when firms’ objectives change due to taxes, subsidies, or demand shifts, the optimal 
strategies of firms can lead to a socially desirable sustainable equilibrium. A simple version of 
the model is adapted into a classroom activity that allows students to discover the main results of 
the model via simulations of corporate decision making. 
 
Key Words: game theory, sustainability, classroom experiment 
 
JEL Classification: A20, C70, Q55 
 
Introduction 
One of the hottest topics on today’s college campuses, in media, and in politics is 
sustainability. Ironically, many different definitions of “sustainable” are currently circulating in 
the ongoing evolution of a more ethical, humane, and environmentally-friendly way of 
conducting business. We focus on a single definition from the World Commission on the 
Environment and Development (WCED) 1987: economic development is sustainable if it fulfills 
the present-generation’s needs without jeopardizing the quality of life and economy of future 
generations. Sustainability is a complex, multi-faceted concept that encompasses ecological, 
economic, and social dimensions. It requires the efficient use of the environment and natural 
resources as well as socially responsible decision-makers.  
Some sustainable practices involve improvements in efficiency or elimination of waste 
that may have previously been unrecognized. As in the use of more efficient lighting 
technologies, these changes likely entail up-front cost, but lower resource consumption and costs 
over time. More recently, improving technologies and productive efficiency have been re-cast as 
a sustainability issue, these choices are part and parcel of every business, regardless of its 
management’s view of sustainability as a guiding business principle. 
Since environmentally friendly and/or socially conscious production processes may be 
more limiting than the alternatives, the adoption of some sustainable technologies may be more 
costly to firms in both the short-term and long-term. For example, a manager of a restaurant may 
use inputs that are produced locally to reduce the carbon emissions released as a result of added 
transport. However, in opting for locally produced inputs, the manager is providing a 
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differentiated product that may be attractive to customers willing to pay extra for dishes 
produced with a lower carbon cost. 
In either case, whether efficiency-improving or society-improving, sustainable business 
practices have the potential to increase a firm’s profits and long-term viability. As a result of the 
growing awareness of sustainable practices, their impact on costs, and the potential for 
improving a company’s reputation among its customers, many business owners are incorporating 
sustainability considerations into their decision-making processes. In effect, as firms commit to 
sustainable business practices they move from a competitive market with negative externalities  
to a monopolistically competitive market where sustainable practices become an embedded 
characteristic of firms product lines, differentiating them from other similar (or even otherwise 
identical) products. If successfully marketed, the firm can convert the benefits that would 
otherwise accrue to society into private profits. If production process characteristics are viewed 
as components of a good, then “Green” can be marketed as a normal-good characteristic, 
whereas, “Brown” would become an inferior characteristic. The existence of otherwise identical 
products differentiated by production processes alone is an indication of the potential 
profitability of green over brown technologies.  
An example of this can be found in green energy. Some publically traded energy 
providers have added power generation and fuel sources that are more environmentally friendly 
than those based on fossil fuels. According to the company’s website, Georgia Power offers a 
“green energy” program on a voluntary basis, allowing interested customers to purchase 
renewable energy, but at an increased price. Keep in mind that, to the end user, the sources used 
for electricity generation are indistinguishable from each other, but in selling green energy, 
Georgia Power is guaranteeing the buyer that the purchased amount of green energy is generated 
and supplied using solar, wind, or some other source generally regarded as green. This option has 
been available from Georgia Power since 2003. Green energy can, in turn, be used in the 
production of other sustainable goods and services. 
It should be noted that the regulatory environment (i.e., governmental and industry-wide 
policies) that a business faces will likely influence the adoption of sustainable practices as well. 
Legislation, tax policy, and industry standards can have the effect of changing the costs and 
benefits of sustainable business practices, and the timing of related decisions. 
We model the short-term and long-term trade-offs that businesses face when choosing 
between sustainable and unsustainable technologies. Using game theory, we identify firms’ 
dominant strategies both with and without government regulation. We describe an adaptation of 
the model that college instructors can use to demonstrate to students the inherent trade-offs 
managers face when trying to balance their various stakeholders’ interests. Finally, we develop a 
game that can effectively engage students and guide them to discover the results of the model via 
first-hand experiences. The classroom presentation and experiment are appropriate for 
introductory business and economics courses. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we review the relevant 
literature, followed by a couple of examples that instructors can use to introduce the model in 
class. We then describe a simple version of the model for use in the classroom, followed by a 
classroom experiment and suggested classroom discussion questions. A more general version of 
the model is presented in the appendix. At last we conclude. 
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Literature 
Heyes (2000), Lawn (2003), Harris and Codur (2004), and Razmi (2012), incorporate 
sustainability elements into well-known economic theories. Heyes (2000) and Lawn (2003) add 
an environmental equilibrium curve to the traditional IS-LM model, while Razmi (2012) models 
emission permits as a short-run stabilization policy tool. Harris and Codur (2004) develop a 
teaching module that introduces the environment to traditional macroeconomic models. For 
instance, they include the biosphere in the Circular Flow Diagram and discuss the role of 
pollution, natural resources, and recycling in the macroeconomy. They also discuss the 
limitations of GDP as a measure of well-being and add an alternative measure called 
environmentally-adjusted GDP.  
These papers all use traditional macroeconomic models. Unlike them, we use game 
theory to model the microeconomic strategies of firms and the effect that economic policies can 
have on them. Moreover, unlike the previous papers, we develop a classroom activity that 
instructors can use to guide students to discover the potential impact on the environment of 
different policy tools.  
Holt and McDaniel (1998) develop a classroom game that can be adapted to teach 
sustainability to students. They use red and black playing cards to demonstrate the Prisoner’s 
dilemma in large classrooms. The advantages of this game are that it can be played in any size 
classroom, students can play individually, and it requires little effort from the instructor as 
students are asked to keep track of their moves and payoffs themselves. The activity that we 
present here requires the instructor to develop an Excel spreadsheet, to communicate with 
students, and to keep track of moves and payoffs of all players. Although more demanding on the 
instructor, our activity incorporates an added level of realism, the effect of government 
intervention on the players’ decisions, and, it encourages interaction among students by making 
them work in a group setting. 
Interactive classroom methods, including games and experiments, are valuable because 
they increase student engagement and learning, and they facilitate the realization of abstract, 
theoretical models in a practical, intuitive way (Holt 1999 and 2003). Moreover, Emerson and 
Taylor (2004), Ball, Eckel and Rojas (2006), Dickie (2006), and Durham, McKinnon and 
Schulman (2007), indicate that the use of interactive teaching techniques can improve student 
performance and grades. 
 
Other Real-World Examples of Green Profits 
Green energy is only one example of a more sustainable product leveraged for additional 
profits. Improvements in lighting technologies have made their way onto the showroom floors of 
the retail auto industry. Although light emitting diodes (LED) have been used in auto head-lights, 
tail-lights and interior displays for several years, LED lighting for building interiors, because of 
its comparatively high initial cost, has taken longer to gain a foothold. A recent auto industry 
article (Treece, 2016) states that auto dealerships are moving toward lighting their lots with the 
more sustainable LED lighting. Apparently, there is a “small but growing group of dealers 
switching to LED lights, particularly for outdoor lighting, because of their low operating costs 
and natural-looking light.” Traditional exterior and interior lighting technologies consume 
significantly larger amounts of electricity and require more frequent maintenance. Furthermore, 
LEDs are directional and can be used to “feature” specific units on the lot. The following is an 
actual cost example taken from the article: 
 
39 | JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 16(1), 2016 
 
 39 
“Reed Lallier Chevrolet, which sold about 1,200 new and 1,000 used vehicles last 
year at its eight-acre site, installed the new lights at the end of last year. For the 
100 light poles, the total installation cost -- including fixtures, controls, labor and 
taxes -- came to about $120,000. Utility-bill savings so far are about $2,000 a 
month. Lallier expects to save another $3,000 a year on maintenance.” (Treece 
2016). 
 
A similar cost-oriented approach has been adopted in segments of the agricultural sector. 
Organic farm products have gained market share and become more widely available over the 
past 25-year period.  Haanaes, et al (2013) identified an Egyptian cotton producer as an example 
of a sustainable farmer who was able to lower farming costs, improve average yields and 
produce a better, more desirable product by adopting organic and sustainable farming practices. 
From 2006 until 2011, the year of turmoil known as the “Arab Spring,” his business grew at an 
average rate of 14% annually. This farm and other similar sustainability-focused businesses, like 
the auto dealers above, have adopted a longer-range view of investing in which initially more-
expensive technologies eventually lead to substantially lower short-run costs of production 
and/or higher productivity per unit of input. Furthermore, the agricultural industry is an example 
of sustainable practices arising from a broader view of the production process. Rather than 
attempting to maximize the profits from each agricultural product in a vacuum, the sustainable 
farmer must understand the potential links and benefits among the various products he or she 
could potentially produce. In the same way that crop rotation requires a multi-period, multi-crop 
approach to avoid environmentally costly and chemically-intensive soil maintenance, the pursuit 
of sustainable business requires an upfront search for system-wide efficiencies which pay off 
over multiple periods of business activity. 
 
A Simple Model for the Classroom 
Consider a two-period model with two firms, A and B. The two periods can be thought of 
as the present (period 1) and the future (period 2). At the beginning of the first period, firms 
simultaneously invest in a production technology. Technology choices last for two periods. For 
simplicity, we assume that there are only two technologies (or production functions) available: 
Green and Brown. The Green technology is environmentally friendly whereas the Brown 
technology is not.  
We assume that period 1 payoffs are higher if the Brown technology is used, and we let P 
> 0 denote the premium short-term profits earned by producing with the Brown technology. 
However, future payoffs increase if at least one firm decides to adopt the Green technology. That 
is, we assume that profits grow by a factor 0 <  < 1 over time, which can be attributed to 
experience, learning by doing, and to the quality of the environment. Finally, whenever a firm 
produces using the Brown technology it depletes the environment introducing additional costs in 
period 2.   
Formally, we assume that if both firms choose the Green technology, their profits grow 
by a factor 0 < αG < 1; if both firms invest in the Brown technology, their profits grow by 0 < αB 
< 1; and if one firm chooses Green and one Brown, profits in period 2 grow by 0 < αM < 1. To 
capture the benefits of Green technologies in the environment, we assume that αG > αM > αB. We 
denote the time discount parameter as 0 < , the tax rate as 0 < t < 1, and subsidies as 0 < s < 
1.
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To find the equilibrium of the game we compare the payoffs of each firm taking the 
strategy of the other firm as given. The appendix develops the general model and solution. In this 
section, we present a simple model assuming specific values for αG, αM, αB., t, s, and P. 
Moreover, we develop a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to facilitate the classroom presentation. 
Drop boxes are used to restrict parameter selection to satisfy the assumptions of the model: when 
the user clicks on an empty cell to choose a parameter (e.g., cell B1 in Figure 1), a drop box with 
a series of options appears; the drop boxes restrict parameter choices to satisfy the inequalities αG 
> αM > αB > 0. 
 
Figure 1: Parameter Choice 
                                
 
The spreadsheet includes a matrix with color-coded payoffs. The payoffs in Figure 2 
correspond to an example in which =0.8, αG =0.4, αM =0.3, αB =0.2, t=0 and s =0.  Whenever a  
 
Figure 2: Payoff Matrix for =0.8, αG =0.4, αM =0.3, αB =0.2, t=0 and s =0 
  
Firm B 
Green  Brown  
Technology Technology 
F
ir
m
 A
 
G
re
en
 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
Firm A’s payoffs: Firm A’s payoffs: 
1.32 1.24 
Firm B’s payoffs: Firm B’s payoffs: 
1.32 1.61 
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Firm A’s payoffs: Firm A’s payoffs: 
1.61 1.51 
Firm B’s payoffs: Firm B’s payoffs: 
1.24 1.51 
 
firm chooses the Green technology, its payoffs are highlighted in green; when a firm chooses the 
Brown technology, its payoffs are highlighted in brown. For instance, when both firms choose 
the Green technology, their payoffs are 1.32. If firm A chooses Green while firm B chooses 
41 | JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 16(1), 2016 
 
 41 
Brown, A’s payoffs are 1.24 while B’s payoffs are 1.61. Instructors can change parameters, one 
at a time, to show students how payoffs change with , αG, αM, αB, t and s. 
 
Figure 3: Firm A’s Payoffs for Different Tax Rates 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Tax Rates that Incentivize the Adoption of Green Technologies 
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We also develop graphs that show how payoffs and strategies change with parameter 
values.  Figures 3 and 4 show the payoffs of firm A for =0.8, αG =0.4, αM =0.3, αB =0.2, s =0 and 
t between 0 and 1. Figure 4 highlights the areas for which choosing Green is a dominant strategy 
and identifies the minimum tax rate needed to induce the socially desirable equilibrium in which 
both firms choose Green. Although these graphs show the dependence of payoffs and strategies 
on taxes, similar graphs can be made to highlight the impact of subsidies. 
 
Classroom Activity 
Instead of presenting the model in class in a lecture format, instructors can allow students 
to “discover” the results of the model with a classroom experiment. Instructors can carry out the 
experiment in a computer lab or in a classroom with Wi-Fi access. If the instructor chooses the 
latter option, he should let students know in advance to bring a computer or tablet to class. 
Prior to the day of the experiment, the instructor creates an Excel spreadsheet that allows 
students to estimate their payoffs. A summary of such a spreadsheet is shown in Figure 5. The 
first two columns in the spreadsheet show the parameter values and the next few columns show 
the payoffs.
2
  
 
Figure 5: Experiment Spreadsheet 
 
 
On the day of the experiment, instructors assign students to groups of two or three. 
Instructors must choose an even number of groups in order to pair them up to play against each 
other. Once groups are chosen, the instructor distributes the Excel file to the students by email or 
by uploading to a course management website. Students are not told who they are matched 
against, but the instructor keeps track of group pairings and choices. Finally, instructors must 
                                                 
2
 The payoffs are entered as formulas. For example, the payoff when both firms choose Green is (1+ αG)(1+s), 
which using the appropriate Excel cells can be written as =(1+(B3*B4))*(1+B8). The payoff when the student 
playing the game chooses Green and his opponent chooses Brown is ( 1 + αM )(1+s), which is equivalent to  
=(1+(B3*B4))*(1+B8) using Excel formulas, etc.  
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choose a way to communicate with students during the activity. We prefer two-way online chats 
between each group and the instructor, but note cards could be used. At the beginning of every 
round, students communicate their choices to the instructor. The instructor tabulates all responses 
and sends a message to each group showing its payoff. The round ends when students learn their 
payoffs. 
During the activity, the instructor has an Excel document open with a list of the groups 
and pairings. For example, suppose there are four groups in the class, labeled A, B, C, and D. 
(For an added touch of fun, instructors can allow students to choose group names). The instructor 
keeps track of choices using a file like the one shown in Figure 6. Ideally, the game is played 
multiple times so that students can discover their optimal strategies. In the example in Figure 6, 
in round 1 group A plays against group B, and group C against group D. In round 2, group A 
plays against C, and B against D. The instructor may choose to reassign the pairs randomly after 
every round. Students, however, never find out who their “opponent” is. To facilitate the 
calculation of payoffs, the instructor’s tracking table (Figure 6) can be embedded with formulas 
that use IF and AND statements that automatically calculate the payoffs.
3
 
 
Figure 6: Instructor’s Tracking Table 
 Group Pairs Choices Payoffs 
Round 
1 
A B         
C D         
Round 
2 
A C         
B D         
Round 
3 
A D         
B C         
Round 
4 
A B         
C D         
Round 
5 
B D         
A D         
Round 
6 
A B         
C D         
 
 
Initially, we recommend setting taxes and subsidies equal to zero, but after a few rounds 
instructors can announce policy changes and instruct students modify the parameter values in 
their spreadsheets. For example, the first four or five rounds can be played using the parameter 
values =0.8, αG =0.4, αM =0.3, αB =0.2, t=0, and s =0. Once strategies converge to the dominant 
strategies, students have discovered the correct solution and the instructor can modify the game. 
Instructors can ask students to modify taxes by clicking on the appropriate drop box (cell B9 in 
Figure 5 in our case) and make them 1% or 0.01, for example. After two or three rounds, 
instructors can change t again, and so on. 
 
                                                 
3
 An example of an IF statement with multiple conditions can be the following: 
=IF(AND(F3="G",G3="G"),(1+(B3*B4))*(1+B8),IF(AND(F3="G",G3="B"),(1+(B3*B5))*(1+B8),IF(AND(F3="B
",G3="G"),(1+(B3*B5))*(1+B7)*(1-B9),IF(AND(F3="B",G3="B"),(1+(B3*B6))*(1+B7)*(1-B9),0)))) 
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Talking Points  
After several rounds of the game, the instructor can end the activity and begin a classroom 
discussion. Based on our experience, we have developed talking points for the discussion: 
 
- How did your group decide on which technology to choose? Did your choice change 
from round to round? Why or why not? 
 
Surprisingly, while most students play the game to maximize their payoffs, there are some 
students who disregard the highest paying strategies and attach intangible utility to choosing the 
environmentally friendly technology. That is, even when the initial parameters and payoffs are 
those depicted in Figure 5, some students still choose the Green technology knowing that their 
profits would be higher if they chose Brown. Some of them claim to be environmentally 
conscious such that profits are not the only goal; others attach a probability to the instructor 
changing the rules midway through the game to punish students who choose the brown 
technology and try to prevent these losses.  
 
- Did your strategy change when we introduced taxes/subsidies? Why or why not? 
 
For the profit-minded students, taxes/subsidies are always effective in inducing the socially 
desirable outcome. In our experience, students are very quick at calculating the point at which 
their strategies change. 
 
- How high do taxes need to be to induce a socially desirable (Green-Green) outcome? Are 
taxes better or worse than subsidies? 
 
When students are provided with the Excel spreadsheet, they can calculate the exact value of 
the taxes that will induce the correct strategy. During classroom discussions, they can debate 
among themselves about what tax is “too high” to pay and whether or not governments should 
really regulate the environmental choices of firms. 
In addition to the classroom discussion, instructors can follow up with a take-home 
assignment by asking students to research the actual regulations that different countries have put 
in place to deal with environmental concerns. 
 
Conclusion 
Using game theory matrices and the concepts of dominant strategies and Nash 
equilibrium, we model the decisions of firms faced with the option of depleting the environment 
for the sake of profits. Our model shows that if environmentally friendly technologies are very 
expensive, then firms choose “dirty” technologies. However, if the long-term benefits of green 
technologies are “large enough” firms can be persuaded to abandon “dirty” technologies in favor 
of sustainable processes. Persuasion can come in the form of government regulation, taxes, or 
pressure from consumers. We develop a simplified version of the model, Excel spreadsheets, and 
a classroom activity that allow students to discover these results by simulating corporate decision 
making. We plan to develop an interface version of the activity that allows students to play 
against the computer. 
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Appendix  
In this appendix we generalize the simple model presented in the paper.  
 
Basic Set-Up: A Model without Government 
We assume two profit maximizing firms, A and B. At the beginning of the first period, 
firms choose (simultaneously) between two technologies: Green (environmentally friendly) and 
Brown. We assume that profits grow by a factor  over time, which can be attributed to 
experience, learning by doing, or to the quality of the environment. Moreover, whenever a firm 
produces using the Brown technology it depletes the environment introducing additional costs in 
period 2.  Formally, we assume that if both firms choose the Green technology, their profits grow 
by a factor αG; if both firms invest in the Brown technology, their profits grow by αB; and if one 
firm chooses Green and one Brown, profits in period 2 grow by αM. To capture the benefits of 
Green technologies in the environment, we assume that αG > αM > αB > 0.   
Letting  denote the time discount parameter, then the two-period discounted payoffs of 
firms A and B can be summarized in the matrix depicted in Table 1. If both firms choose the 
Green technology, they each earn profits G in period 1 and αG G in period 2. If both firms 
choose the Brown technology, they both earn  (1 + P)G in period 1 and αB (1+ P)G in period 2, 
where P denotes the short term savings from using the Brown technology. If one firm chooses 
the Green technology and the other the Brown technology, the firm that chooses Green receives 
G in period 1 and αM G  in period 2, while the firm that chooses the Brown technology receives 
(1+ P)G  in period 1 and αM  (1+ P)G in period 2. 
To find the equilibrium of the game we compare the payoffs of each firm taking the strategy 
of the other firm as given. We find that for certain values of the parameters, choosing the Brown 
technology is always optimal, no matter what the other firm does; for other values, choosing the 
Green technology is always optimal. We summarize these conditions in Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1:  
 If P >  (αM  – αB )/ (1 + αB) and P >  (αG – αM )/ (1 + αM),  then the unique 
Nash equilibrium of the game is for both firms to choose the Brown technology. 
 If P <  (αM – αB )/ (1 + αB) and P <  (αG – αM )/ (1 + αM),  then the unique 
Nash equilibrium of the game is for both firms to choose the Green technology. 
 
Table 1: Payoff Matrix 
 Firm B 
Green Technology Brown Technology 
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Firm A’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αG) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αG) G 
Firm A’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αM ) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αM )(1+P) G 
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Firm A’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αM )(1+P) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αM ) G 
Firm A’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αB) (1+ P) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αB) (1+ P) G 
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According to Proposition 1, if the monetary costs from adopting Green technologies are 
“high enough,” then firms are better off choosing Brown technologies. In the next section we 
investigate the alternatives of governments or regulatory agencies to change these choices. 
 
Regulations 
Assume that P is “large enough” and thus that the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is 
for both firms to choose the Brown technology. In this section we modify the payoffs of firms by 
assuming that governments levy a tax, t, on firms that choose the Brown technology. The 
modified two-period discounted payoffs of firms can be summarized in Table 2.  
A comparison of payoffs leads to the conclusion that if taxes t are “large enough,” the 
Green technology becomes a dominant strategy and the unique Nash equilibrium of the game 
occurs when both firms choose the Green technology.  We summarize this in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: If t >((αM – αB )-(1+αB)P)/αBP) and t >((αG – αM )-
(1+αM)P)/αMP), then the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is for both 
firms to choose the Green technology. 
 
Table 2: Payoffs with Taxes 
 Firm B 
Green Technology Brown Technology 
F
ir
m
 A
 G
re
en
 
T
ec
h
n
o
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g
y
 
Firm A’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αG ) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αG ) G 
Firm A’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αM ) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αM )(1+P)(1-t) G 
B
ro
w
n
 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
Firm A’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αM )(1+P)(1-t) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αM ) G 
Firm A’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αB) (1+ P)(1-t) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αB )(1+ P)(1-t) G 
 
In addition to levying a tax, governments may offer subsidies to firms that choose Green 
technologies, or a combination of subsidies and taxes. A subsidy s increases the payoffs of Green 
firms and leaves the payoffs of Brown firms unchanged. Table 3 summarizes the payoffs when 
both subsidies and taxes are imposed, while Proposition 3 summarizes the conditions under 
which (Green, Green) is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3: If (1+s)/(1-t) > (1 + αB)(1+P)/αB and (1+s)/(1-t ) >  (1 + 
αM)(1+P)/αM, then the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is for both firms to 
choose the Green technology. 
 
Changing firms’ objectives via taxes or subsidies can lead to a socially desirable 
outcome: a sustainable equilibrium.  Although the model assumes that the variations in payoffs 
come from government regulations, the payoffs can be interpreted as imposed by consumers. For 
example, if many consumers decide to patronize only the firms that use sustainable technologies, 
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demand for the products of the firms using Brown technologies decreases. This is akin to a tax 
on firms using cheaper, yet “dirtier”, technologies. 
 
Table 3: Payoffs with Taxes and Subsidies 
 Firm B 
Green Technology Brown Technology 
F
ir
m
 A
 
G
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en
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Firm A’s payoffs: 
(1 + αG )(1+s) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
(1 + αG )(1+s) G 
Firm A’s payoffs: 
(1 + αM )(1+s) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
(1 + αM )(1+P)(1-t) G 
B
ro
w
n
 
T
ec
h
n
o
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g
y
 
Firm A’s payoffs: 
(1 + αM )(1+P)(1-t) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
( 1 + αM )(1+s) G 
Firm A’s payoffs: 
(1 + αB )(1+ P)(1-t) G 
Firm B’s payoffs: 
(1 + αB )(1+ P)(1-t) G 
 
 
